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Abstract 
 
This paper explores the recent attempt of the international community to develop greater 
consistency and coherence in the United Nations (UN) system, and the implications this may 
hold for the European integration movement. The paper identifies the postulated standards 
of policy coherence currently employed for international organisations, the delineation of 
regions (as these are informally understood in the UN), and the current locations of UN global 
and regional offices. The scope for reconfiguration of the UN regional institutional setting is 
explored. Prescriptively, the paper asks whether the delineation of ‘region’ is adequate for 
the current times, and whether a standardised definition of ‘region’ can feasibly be 
developed. Concluding that this is possible, the paper then explores the possible scenario for 
new regional hubs, including the co-location of regional offices that would meet the required 
reform in consistency and policy coherence for the UN. Within that context the paper 
considers the implications such changes might carry for Europe – for the region, for its various 
regional organisations, and for their relationship with the UN. The paper concludes by 
identifying the political and diplomatic process by which such institutional reform might be 
pursued. 
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1. Introduction: Objective and Structure of the Paper 
 
The aim of this Paper is two-fold: to explore the implications of the recommendations in the 
Report of the High-level Panel on UN System-wide Coherence (HLP report) insofar as they 
relate to regional structures, both UN and non-UN;1 and to assess the implications of these 
recommendations for Europe as a ‘region’. The analytical and prescriptive content addresses 
both substantive issues (the nature of the shortcomings and recommendations advanced in 
the HLP report) and structural issues (the breadth of the institutions potentially affected, with 
special reference to Europe as a ‘region’). The Paper argues that, with due regard to the 
political sensitivities of the challenge, it is possible to engage in reform of the UN whereby 
greater consistency and coherence can be attained to streamline the operational partner-
ship between the UN and regional organisations. To that end it proposes that a standardised 
definition of ‘region’ be agreed, and that a series of regions (and their sub-regions) be 
identified based on the definition. The Paper proposes also that consideration be given to 
identifying certain natural ‘regional capitals’ in Africa, the Arab world, Europe, Asia-Pacific 
and the Americas. It focuses on the five themes derived from the Report’s recommendations, 
assessing their merit and exploring how they might be implemented. The principal themes 
explored are: 
 
•  regional hubs; 
•  roles of regional commissions; 
•  reconfiguration of UN regional setting; 
•  standardisation of the definition of ‘region’; and 
•  co-location of UN regional offices.  
 
In an institutional sense, regionalism is of two broad dimensions: on the one hand, those 
entities that are part of the UN system itself and operate within its overall purview; and on the 
other hand, those entities that are exogenous to the UN system, created beyond its purview 
and which operate autonomously, but which were foreseen in the UN Charter as part of a 
collaborative institutional network pursuing the common ends of the international community, 
identified generically in Chapter VIII of the Charter.2  
 
Within the UN system itself, a further distinction needs to be drawn. Regional institutions may 
be of three kinds:  
 
•  there are UN programmes or funds established by the General Assembly or by 
ECOSOC under their respective powers to create ‘conditions of stability and well-
being’ through economic and social development under Chapters IX and X of the 
Charter;3 
•  there are specialised agencies, established by intergovernmental agreement, with 
mandates in economic, social, cultural, educational, health and related fields, which 
are ‘brought into relationship’ with the UN, identified generically under Chapter IX of 
the Charter;4 and 
•  there are UN commissions dealing with economic and social issues, established by 
ECOSOC under Chapter XI of the Charter.5  
 
The basic distinction between the internal UN system and the external UN partnerships 
underpins the structure of this Paper, both its analytical and prescriptive parts. The two basic 
institution types are referred to henceforth as ‘UN system bodies’ (Chapters IX and X entities) 
and ‘exogenous bodies’ (Chapter VIII entities). The substantive issues explored in this Paper 
                                                 
1   Delivering as One:  Report of the Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel on UN System-wide 
Coherence in the Areas of Development, Humanitarian Assistance, and the Environment, United 
Nations, New York (advance, unedited version, 9 November 2006, not depicted by symbol as at June 
2007).  
2   UN Charter, Articles 52-54.  
3   UN Charter, Article 55. 
4   UN Charter, Article 57. 
5   UN Charter, Article 68. 
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are thus applied to two institutional levels, namely: the UN system (Chapters IX and X entities); 
and the broader UN partnership network (Chapter VIII entities).  
 
The analysis and prescription for Chapter VIII entities is strictly beyond the scope of the HLP 
Report and the ongoing deliberations at the United Nations. No decisions can be made 
within that context by the General Assembly or ECOSOC pertaining to Chapter VIII agencies 
which are, themselves, autonomous international organisations or arrangements. Because 
the goal of consistency and coherence is common to both internal and external aspects of 
UN functioning, however, and because the international community has an interest in 
achieving it across all aspects of international activity, it is important that the external aspects 
be addressed as well. It would be self-defeating to structure a consistent and coherent 
institutional architecture for the UN system that bore no rational relationship to the nature of 
the broader UN partnership network. The constituent memberships, moreover, are common 
to both – it is the nation-states themselves that make decisions in both internal UN and 
exogenous regional organisational settings. So it is open to them to make decisions pertaining 
to the former within the UN system, as well as recommendations pertaining to the latter, 
which could then be made binding in the institutional context of Chapter VIII regional 
organisations. Having regard to these considerations, this Paper is structured as follows: 
 
•  Section 2 reviews the HLP Report and explores the postulated standards of 
consistency and coherence within the UN system.  
•  The analytical section 3 examines the current regional institutional architecture of the 
UN system as well as the exogenous regional entities associated with the UN under the 
Charter. 
•  The prescriptive section 4 considers how the ‘regional recommendations’ of the HLP 
Report might be achieved. In this respect, the Paper encompasses four of the five 
recommendations by proposing three institutional changes for the consideration of 
UN Member States: reconfiguration of the UN regional setting in a general sense; 
standardisation of the definition of ‘region’ and identification of specific regions for all 
UN purposes; and identification of cities as ‘regional hubs’ and co-location of all UN 
regional offices.  
•  Section 5 applies the insights contained in the Panel’s recommendations to the 
special case of Europe, exploring the implications these may have for its future 
development as a ‘united region’ – not simply in the immediate post-Cold War world 
but as the 21st century unfolds. This section considers, on the one hand, Europe’s many 
well-developed and geographically overlapping regional structures and, on the other 
hand, at least one regional actor that has the ambition to be a ‘global player’ (the 
EU). This in turn throws light on the challenges such an aspiration poses for the larger 
debate over UN – regional organisation collaboration.   
•  The final section 6 explores the political and diplomatic process through which a 
‘coherent regional institutional landscape’ might be achieved. 
 
 
2. The High-level Report on UN System-wide Coherence 
 
The United Nations system is global, vast and complex. It comprises 17 specialised agencies 
and related organisations, 14 funds and programmes, 17 departments and offices within the 
Secretariat, 5 regional commissions, 5 research and training institutes and a plethora of 
regional and country-level structures. Its constituent members are the 192 sovereign Member 
States. Its preamble opens in the name of “We the peoples” – effectively the whole human 
family. Its stated purposes – the preservation of peace, the promotion of human rights, and 
economic and social development – are effectively the core responsibilities of global 
governance. There is no greater global challenge than to ensure that the UN system can 
function effectively and efficiently. Partly because of the magnitude of the undertaking, 
partly because of resource constraints, the UN system is imperfect in structure, method and 
coordination. As such it is an easy target for criticism, much of it justified, some of it unfair.  
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UN System-wide Coherence: The High-level Panel Process  
 
At their 2005 Summit, world leaders agreed on the need for stronger ‘system-wide 
coherence’ of the United Nations system.6 A series of ten measures were envisaged to this 
end in policy, operational activities, humanitarian assistance and environmental activities. 
Three objectives in particular were identified by world leaders: 
 
•  to strengthen linkages between the normative work of the UN system and its 
operational activities; 
•  to ensure that horizontal policy themes (sustainable development, human rights, and 
gender issues) are taken into account in UN decision-making; and 
•  to ensure a ‘more effective, efficient, coherent, coordinated and better-performing’ 
UN country presence, with appropriate authority and common management.  
 
Accordingly world leaders invited the Secretary-General to ‘launch work to further strengthen 
the management and coordination of UN operational activities … including proposals … for 
more tightly managed entities in the fields of development, humanitarian activities and 
environment’. In February 2006 the Secretary-General established a High-level Panel on UN 
System-wide Coherence in these three areas. The Panel’s Report was submitted to the 
Secretary-General in November 2006.  
 
The case for reform, as set out in the HLP Report, rests on the need for efficiency. The 
multilateral institutions of the 1940s remain with us today, but a new set of challenges are 
faced in the 21st century – interdependence with inequality. The United Nations, having 
played a crucial role in articulating the Millennium Development  Goals (MDGs) in 2000, 
needed now to take action in helping achieve them. Without ambitious and far-reaching 
reform, the UN would be unable to deliver on its promises and remain at the heart of the 
multilateral system. The UN’s work in development and environment was often fragmented 
and weak. Inefficient and ineffective governance and unpredictable funding had 
contributed to ‘policy incoherence, duplication and operational ineffectiveness’ across the 
system. Cooperation between organisations had been hindered by competition for funding, 
mission creep and outdated business practices. To rectify these shortcomings, the Report 
advanced a series of recommendations, based on four main strategic directions:7 
 
•  coherence and consolidation of UN activities, based on the principle of country 
ownership at all levels (country, regional, headquarters); 
•  appropriate governance, managerial and funding mechanisms; 
•  overhaul of business practices in the UN system to ensure proper focus on outcomes; 
and 
•  consolidation and delivery of ‘One UN’ through an in-depth review. 
 
The essence of the Panel’s vision was for the UN to ‘deliver as one’ in development, 
humanitarian assistance and the environment. The UN’s normative and analytical expertise, 
operational and coordination activities, and advocacy role would be more effectively 
brought together at the national, regional and global levels.8 The principal recommendation 
was the establishment of ‘One UN’ at country level, ‘with one leader, one programme, one 
budget, and where appropriate, one office’.  The Panel also recommended an independent 
task force to further eliminate duplication within the UN system, and consolidate UN entities 
where necessary. A number of ‘pilot countries’ are now being identified to test the new 
measures.9 
 
 
                                                 
6   UNGA Resolution 1, adopted 16 September 2005. 
7   A fifth recommendation calls for urgency in the implementation of these four directions.  
8   HLP Report, p. 2. 
9    The first eight ‘pilot countries’ are Albania, Cape Verde, Mozambique, Pakistan, Rwanda, 
Tanzania, Uruguay and Vietnam.  
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Implications for Regionalism: “A Coherent Regional Institutional Landscape”  
 
The Panel’s analysis of regional level activities of the UN system was frank: “Signs of fragmen-
tation are also apparent at the regional level. Regional offices of different UN agencies are 
scattered in different locations, and definitions of regions can differ from one agency to 
another. In some regions, strong regional and sub-regional institutions either exist or are 
rapidly evolving while others have strayed from their original mandates. This calls for a review 
of the UN’s regional roles and settings, including the Regional Commissions, to address 
regional needs, avoid duplication and overlapping functions and seek a coherent regional 
institutional landscape.”10  
 
“The regional economic commissions were established to promote economic and social 
development in their regions. And UN funds, programmes and agencies have developed 
regional mechanisms to provide technical and management support to their country offices. 
The result: a broad regional presence for the UN, providing a vast potential of assets and 
expertise, but increasing duplication, fragmentation and incoherence. Over time, certain 
regional commissions have continued to meet regional needs while others have lost focus in 
applying their comparative strength in conducting regional analysis, developing policy 
frameworks and norms and supporting regional integration efforts and activities – instead of 
devoting attention to operational activities at the country level. Strong institutional 
arrangements are now needed to ensure complementarities and build a genuine culture of 
cooperation among all UN organisations active in each region, as well as between the UN 
and non-UN regional entities.”11  
 
To achieve this vision, the Panel advanced the following recommendations: 
 
Governance: 
 
•  The important regional work of the UN must be streamlined by establishing regional 
hubs to support UN country-teams and clarifying the roles of regional commissions.12  
•  Review the functioning and continuing relevance of existing regional structures in 
addressing regional needs, taking into account the different needs of regions and the 
emergence of strong regional and sub-regional institutions. The review should also 
consider options for streamlining and consolidation.13  
 
Regional Structures and Coordination: 
 
•  UN entities at the regional level should be reconfigured and the UN regional setting 
should be reorganised around two inter-related sets of functions: first, focusing on 
analytical and normative work, as well as activities of a trans-boundary nature. The 
regional commissions would act as a catalyst for these functions, using, inter alia, their 
convening power at both the inter-governmental and secretariat levels; second, 
focusing on coordinating the servicing of inter-country teams. Being responsible for 
managing the Resident Coordinator system, UNDP would act as the catalyst for these 
functions.  
•  Regional offices of UN entities should be co-located and the definition of regions 
among all UN entities should be standardised to ensure consistency and coherence in 
the work of the UN at the regional level.  
 
These ‘regional recommendations’ of the High-level Panel’s Report form the substance of this 
Paper’s analysis and prescription. The first requirement is to clarify what standards are 
expected in attaining ‘consistency and coherence’ in the UN system.  
 
                                                 
10   HLP Report., p. 10. 
11   Ibid., paras 66 and 67, p. 34. 
12   Ibid., para 54, p. 28. 
13   Ibid., para 56, p. 29. 
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Postulated Standards: ‘Consistency’ and ‘Coherence’ within the UN System 
 
The goal of ‘consistency and coherence’ has become a standard-cry of the UN / Bretton 
Woods system and the broader international community for some years now. The UN General 
Assembly stresses the need for ‘efficiency, consistency and coherence in the unification and 
harmonisation of international trade law’.14 The International Conference for Financing for 
Development stresses the need to enhance the coherence and consistency of the 
international monetary, financial and trading systems, in order to support the MDG goals. A 
senior FAO official (2004) talks of ‘policy coherence for agriculture and development’.15 The 
Chair of the UN Commission on Global Migration appeals for ‘policy coherence’ to ease the 
suffering that is currently endemic to migration – defining it as ‘consistency of laws across 
nations of origin, transit and destination’.16 An Amnesty International expert urges the EU to 
achieve ‘coherence and consistency in support of human rights amongst EU institutions and 
Member States.’17  
 
The dictionary meaning of ‘consistent’ is ‘conforming to a regular pattern’. The call for 
consistency throughout the UN system thus means, prima facie, that all UN institutions around 
the planet should conform to a regular pattern. ‘Coherent’ carries three meanings:  
 
•  a logical and consistent argument;  
•  the ability to speak clearly and logically; and  
•  holding together to form a whole.  
 
The call for the UN to be coherent thus means that it should hold together institutionally to 
form a recognisable whole, and that its ‘voice’ (i.e. policy formulation and articulation) and 
its ‘action’ (i.e. operational activities) should be clear, logical and consistent. Having regard 
to these meanings, there would thus appear to be two dimensions to consistency and 
coherence: institutional and policy. The two concepts of ‘policy consistency and coherence’ 
and ‘institutional consistency and coherence’ are thus employed in this Paper for analytical 
and prescriptive purposes. ‘Policy coherence for development’ is defined in the OECD-DAC 
as ‘the systematic promotion of mutually reinforcing policy actions across government 
departments and agencies creating synergies towards achieving the defined objectives’.18 
An expert team has identified four dimensions to policy coherence, namely: 
 
•  internal consistency (within a donor’s ODA programme); 
•  governmental consistency (between a donor’s ODA and other policies); 
•  harmonisation (between ODA/non-ODA policies across all donors); and 
•  alignment (between donor policy and recipient country strategy).19  
 
Institutional coherence may be seen as a facilitator of policy coherence. It has attracted the 
most attention in UN reform efforts over the yea r s .  I t  i s  n o  a c c i d e n t  t h a t  t h e  H L P  r e p o r t  
devotes most of its analysis and prescription to the institutional dimension of the UN system. In 
addressing the regional dimension of the HLP report, this Paper uses the concept of 
‘consistency and coherence’ in the above manner.  
 
                                                 
14   UNGA Resolution, 161, para. 6 (a), adopted 16 December 1996. 
15   Fresco, Louise O., ‘Policy Coherence for agriculture and development’, Spotlight, FAO, 2004, 
www.fao.org/AG/magazine/0406sp.htm.  
16   Wright, Sarah, ‘Migration policy coherence needed, U.N. official says’, MIT Tech Talk, vol. 49, no. 
6, 2004, p. 6. 
17   Oosting, Dick, ‘Putting Human Rights into Practice’, Challenge Europe, European Policy Centre, 
issue 3, www.epc.eu/en/ce.asp?TYP=CE&LV=177&see=y&t=42&PG=CE/EN/detail&l=13&AI=101.  
18    OECD, ‘Policy Coherence: Vital for Global Development’, Policy Brief, July 2003, p. 2, 
www.oecd.org/dataoecd/11/35/20202515.pdf.  
19   Picciotto, Rorbert et al., Striking a New Balance: Donor Policy Coherence and Development 
Cooperation in Difficult Environments, Background paper commissioned by the Learning and Advisory 
Process on Difficult Partnerships of the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD, London, 
Department for International Development, 2005, www.oecd.org/dataoecd/31/62/34252747.pdf.  
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3. Analysis: Regional Structures of the Contemporary International System 
 
An analysis of the current regional structures of the international system involves two 
dimensions, namely: the current delineations of the various ‘regions’; and the current 
locations of the offices of the organisations that serve the ‘regions’.  
 
3.1. Current Delineations of ‘Regions’ 
 
To date the international community has not developed any definition of a ‘region’ for either 
structural or operational purposes. The structure of ‘regions’ as they currently exist is the result 
of practical decisions usually taken in the local areas that respond more to national interests 
and logic than to any overall global ‘coherence’. Section 1 drew the distinction between the 
internal UN system and the broader external UN partnership. This basic distinction structures 
the analysis in this section.  
 
Regions within the UN System  
 
The UN has used the concept of regionalism in two fundamental ways: electoral and 
operational. As the evidence below illustrates, the ‘regions’ employed for these purposes are 
substantially different. The question warrants exploration whether it is feasible, and whether 
there is merit, in rationalising the use of the concept of ‘region’ for all, or some, of the above 
purposes. The electoral groups are an informal mechanism agreed by General Assembly 
resolution solely for the purpose of elections to UN bodies. They have experienced an 
evolutionary development from an informal beginning. Their origin lies in the Gentlemen’s 
Agreement of 1946 for the election to the 1st General Assembly Session, replicated over the 
following three years.20  
 
Although the groupings were informally developed for electoral purposes only, their functions, 
having thus been formalised since in UNGA resolutions, have expanded. The grouping has in 
fact assumed two functions – electoral and ‘caucusing’. The latter function presumes a 
minimum degree of political concord within a group; in some cases a group will not 
undertake caucusing or a State may be a member of a group for electoral purposes only 
and not participate in a caucus function. Thus, Australia and New Zealand found it 
inappropriate, in the past, to be a member of their geographical group (Asia-Pacific) and 
joined the Western Europe group. Canada has no geographical group, the Americas being 
confined simply to Latin America-Caribbean. Today, Australia and New Zealand are 
politically closer to the Asia-Pacific region, and there is some prospect of a change in due 
course.21 Table 1 illustrates the electoral groupings of the UN Member States under current 
arrangements. The following may be inferred: 
 
•  The electoral groups for Africa, Asia-Pacific and Latin-America reflect predominantly 
geographical consideration, while ‘Europe’ reflects predominantly political considera-
tions. In the latter respect, ‘Europe’ shows retention of the Cold War division between 
western and eastern Europe, nearly two decades after the end of the political-
strategic era that justified such a division; and inclusion of two Pacific and one North 
American country.  
•  The self-exclusion of two countries from any electoral grouping – the USA and Kiribati. 
The US declines to be a member of any regional group – yet attends the WEOG for 
electoral purposes, and also remains in it for caucusing.  
                                                 
20   Daws, Sam, ‘The Origins and Development of UN Electoral Groups’, in Ramesh Thakur (ed.), 
What Is Equitable Geographical Representation in the Twenty-First Century, Tokyo, United Nations 
University, 1999, p. 11. 
21   “Australia has also long argued that the UN electoral system needs to be updated to reflect 
changes in the international system. In particular, the old divide between East and West Europe should 
be adapted to reflect the new converging European reality. The Panel's proposals for a distribution of 
Council seats between four new major regional electoral groups – with Australia to join the Asia Pacific 
group – is a good start and one that we strongly support.” Address by Foreign Minister Alexander 
Downer, 19 January 2005, www.foreignminister.gov.au/speeches/2005/050119_reforming_un.html.  
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Table 1: UN Electoral Groupings 
Africa ‘Europe’   
(EU Member States identified in bold) 
Asia Latin  America-
Caribbean 
 WEOG  EEG  Asia  Pacific   
 WE  Other        
Algeria Andorra    Albania  Afghanistan    Antigua-Barb 
Angola   Australia  Armenia  Bahrain    Argentina 
Benin  Austria   Azerbaijan  Bangladesh    Bahamas 
Botswana  Belgium   Belarus  Bhutan    Barbados 
Burkina Faso    Canada  Bosnia-Herz  Brunei    Belize 
Burundi  Denmark    Bulgaria  Cambodia   Bolivia 
Cameroon  Finland   Croatia  China    Brazil 
Cape Verde  France    Czech Rep  Cyprus   Chile 
CAR  Germany    Estonia  DPR Korea    Colombia 
Chad  Greece   Georgia    Fiji  Costa  Rica 
Comoros Iceland    Hungary  India   Cuba 
Côte d’Ivoire  Ireland    Latvia  Indonesia   Dominica 
DR Congo  Israel (NY)    Lithuania  Iran   Dominican  Rep 
Congo Rep  Italy    Poland  Iraq   Ecuador 
Djibouti  Liechtenstein    FYR Macedon  Japan    El Salvador 
Egypt  Luxembourg   Montenegro  Jordan    Grenada 
Eq. Guinea  Malta   Moldova  Kazakhstan    Guatemala 
Eritrea Monaco    Romania  Kuwait   Guyana 
Ethiopia  Netherlands   Russia  Kyrgyzstan    Haiti 
Gabon   New  Zealand  Serbia  Laos   Honduras 
Gambia Norway    Slovakia  Lebanon   Jamaica 
Ghana  Portugal    Slovenia  Malaysia   Mexico 
Guinea San  Marino    Ukraine Maldives    Nicaragua 
Guinea-Biss  Spain       Marshall  Is  Panama 
Kenya  Sweden       Micronesia  Paraguay 
Lesotho Switzerland      Mongolia    Peru 
Liberia Turkey      Myanmar    St  Kitts  Nevis 
Libya  UK       Nauru  St  Lucia 
Madagascar        Nepal    St Vincent Gr 
Malawi       Oman    Suriname 
Mali       Pakistan    Trinidad  Tob 
Mauritania        Palau  Uruguay 
Mauritius        PNG  Venezuela 
Morocco       Philippines     
Mozambique       Qatar     
Namibia       Rep.  Korea     
Niger        Samoa   
Nigeria       Saudi  Arabia     
Rwanda       Singapore     
Sao Tome Pr           Solomon Is   
Senegal       Sri  Lanka     
Seychelles       Syria     
Sierra Leone        Tajikistan     
Somalia       Thailand     
South Africa        Timor Leste     
Sudan          Tonga   
Swaziland       Turkmenistan     
Tanzania        Tuvalu   
Togo       UAE    
Tunisia       Uzbekistan     
Uganda        Vanuatu   
Zambia       Vietnam     
Zimbabwe       Yemen     
53 28 23  53  33 
Unattached 
 USA        Kiribati*   
* Kiribati considers itself to be part of the Asian group, but this has not yet been formalised.22 
 
 
                                                 
22   Correspondence with Kiribati Foreign Ministry official (June 2007). 
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As noted, the UN maintains in its operational work a variety of institutions: regional com-
missions, programmes and funds, and specialised agencies. These interact closely, albeit not 
with a high degree of consistency and coherence. It is instructive, in the context of the 
Panel’s recommendations, to undertake an analytical summary of the current ‘regions’ 
employed by each of these three types of entity. The regional economic commissions are 
perhaps the clearest example of regionalism within the UN system. While they were 
conceived as instruments of socio-economic promotion under the Charter itself, the relevant 
provision did not expressly stipulate that these had to be based on geographical considera-
tions.23 Yet the first move to establish such commissions reflected a perhaps instinctual 
preference for a regional approach. It derived from the recognition of the need to 
resuscitate economic activity and social stability in the ‘areas’ devastated by World War II (as 
with the Covenant of the League of Nations after World War I).24 In July 1946 the Temporary 
Sub-Commission on the Economic Reconstruction of Devastated Areas recommended to 
ECOSOC the establishment of an Economic Commission for Europe. In December the 
General Assembly asked ECOSOC to establish an Economic Commission for Europe and, 
separately, one for ‘Asia and the Far East’. ECOSOC duly did so in March 1947.25 
 
O t h e r  r e g i o n a l  b o d i e s  w e r e  a l w a y s  e n v i s a g e d .  I n  J u l y  1 9 4 7 ,  E C O S O C  r e q u e s t e d  t h e  
Economic and Employment Commission to study the ‘general problems’ connected with the 
establishment of ‘regional commissions’ as a means of promoting the purposes and principles 
of the UN. ECOSOC concurrently established a committee to study the factors involved in 
such a commission for Latin America and the Caribbean and established the commission in 
February 1948 (ECLA). A name-change followed over three decades later to include the 
Caribbean as a separate sub-regional entity.26 In September 1951 ECOSOC, noting the 
valuable work completed by ECE, ECAFE and ECLA over the preceding five years, resolved 
to continue them,27 and this was endorsed by the General Assembly.28 The same year an 
expert group under the Secretary-General recommended that an economic commission for 
Africa be established. 29 It took another seven years, however, for ECOSOC to establish 
CA.30  
         
E
 
The commission for West Asia had a more difficult gestation. In October 1947 the General 
Assembly had invited ECOSOC to study the factors bearing upon the establishment of an 
economic commission for the ‘Middle East’,31 and in December 1948 it had recommended 
                                           
at the 
ena
sia and the Far East) changed to ESCAP (Economic Commission for Asia and the 
ific)
 1984/67 of 27 July 1984 respectively. 
1951. 
nomic Development of Under-Developed Countries, UN Publications, Sales 
195
, on the recommendation of the General Assembly, 
 r
23   UN Charter, Article 68. 
24   No definition of a ‘region’ was advanced at Versailles.  Indeed, the Euro-centric focus of post-
war planning a century ago is shown by the sole reference to ‘region’ in the Covenant – that the 
special necessities of the ‘regions devastated during the war of 1914-18’ shall be borne in mind in re-
building post-war commerce (League of Nations Covenant (1919), Article 23).  It is notable th
Cov nt used the term ‘regions’ while the UN Charter referred to ‘areas’ (see footnote below). 
25   UNGA resolution 46 (I) of 11 December 1946 and ECOSOC resolutions 36 (IV) & 37 (IV) of 28 
March 1947, establishing ECAFE and ECE respectively. The additional phrase ‘Far East’, in contra-
distinction to ‘Asia’, originated in the use by the British Empire of the division between its imperial 
possessions (the ‘Near East’ encompassed the lands of the Ottoman Empire; the ‘Middle East’ 
encompassed North Africa/Southwest Asia; ‘Asia’ covered South Asia; and the ‘Far East’ denoted what 
is now known as East Asia and Southeast Asia. The phrase was in continued use during World War II 
(British Far East Command; US Far East Air Force) and during immediate post-war planning (the 
International Military Tribunal for the Far East dealt with the Japanese war crimes trials). It then entered 
early UN terminology until its quintessential Euro-centricism was repudiated and ECAFE (Economic 
Commission for A
Pac  in 1974.  
26   ECOSOC resolutions 106 (VI) of 25 February 1948, and
27   ECOSOC resolution 414 (XIII) of 20 September 
28   UNGA resolution 526 (VI) of 26 January 1952. 
29   Measures for the Eco
No.  1.II.B.2, p. 95.  
30   ECOSOC resolution 671 A (XXV) of 1958
UNGA esolution 1155 (XII) of 26 November 1957. 
31   UNGA resolution 120 (II) of 31 October 1947. 
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that ECOSOC ‘expedite consideration’ of the issue.32 No progress was achieved, however. 
The creation of ECA resulted in the inclusion of those countries of North Africa that formed a 
part of the ‘Middle East’. The UN Economic and Social Office in Beirut (UNESOB) was 
subsequently established. UNESOB was regarded as a de facto economic commission and 
as finally transformed into ESCWA in 1973.33  
jor specialised agencies 
, 
oundaries – this affects especially the position of the Arab States and 
 while a few others are content to use a post-colonial term (Middle East, Near 
-
logy, the UN Secretariat itself, surprisingly, retains the Euro-centric term ‘Middle East’. 
UN  – Commissions and Programmes: Major Regio
UN  e
 
UN Specialised Agencies 
w
 
Table 2 shows the conceptualisation of ‘regions’ as observed for functional and operational 
purposes by the principal entities within the UN system – the Secretariat, the regional 
economic commissions, the major UN programmes & funds, the ma
and other related UN organisations. The following may be observed: 
 
•  There is a basic underlying pattern of regionalism observed by the major UN entities
corresponding to the four main continents – Africa, Asia, Europe and the Americas.   
•  That continental delineation, however, is by no means precise, most particularly the 
trilateral conjunction of Africa, Europe and Asia. There is significant ‘cross-lapping’ at 
these regional b
the CIS States.  
•  A few entities have no compunction in utilising the political-cultural term ‘Arab States’. 
A majority employ a geographical term (North Africa-West Asia, Eastern Mediterra-
nean),
East). 
•  While the regional economic commissions hew studiously to geographical termino
 
Table 2:   System nal Groupings 
Progamm s & Funds  UN Secre-
tariat 
Regional 
Comm.  UN A  UNDP  UNEP  IBRD  ILO  WHO  FAO 
Econ. 
UNICEF  FP
West & 
Central 
Africa 
 
 
Africa 
 
Africa  Saharan 
Africa 
Africa  Africa  Africa  Africa  Africa  Africa 
 
 
Sthn & 
Eastern 
Africa 
 
Sub- 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
          
M  
Asia 
N.  
M  
East 
N.  
M  
East  Sta s 
West sia 
N.  
M  
East  Sta s  Me
iddle
East 
West 
 A a
&  
iddle
fric  A a
&  
iddle
fric
Arab 
te
 A
 A a
&  
iddle
fric
Arab 
te
East 
dit. 
West. 
Europe 
    
  
Eastern 
Europe 
Europe  Europe 
C  
Europe  Europe  Europe 
 
 
 
 
Europe  
& 
entral
Asia 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Near 
East &  
Central 
& 
Eastern 
E  
& CIS  ral
Europ  
CIS  
urope
Eastern 
Europe 
& Cent-
 Asia 
 
 
e
& 
South 
Asia 
S.E. 
Asia 
 
Asia- 
Pacific 
 
Asia- 
Pacific 
Pacific  Pacific  Pacific 
Pacific  S.E. Asia  Pacific  Pacific  E. Asia-  Asia-   Asia-  
 
Asia-  
 
Asia- 
West. 
Pacific 
 
Asia- 
            N. Ameri-
ca-Carib. 
Latin 
America  America  America  America  America  America  America  America 
A
icas 
America 
Carib.-
Latin 
Carib.-
Latin 
Carib.-
Latin 
Carib.-
Latin 
Carib.-
Latin 
Carib.-
Latin 
Carib.-
Latin 
 
mer- Carib.-
Latin 
 
‘Regions’ Outside the UN System 
 
As noted earlier, the Chapter VIII entities were envisaged by the framers of the UN Charter as 
regional bodies that would cooperate with the United Nations. The Charter refers to ‘regional 
                                                 
32   UNGA resolution 199 (III) of 4 December 1948.  
33   ECOSOC resolution 1818 (LV) of 1973. 
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arrangements and agencies’.34 Such bodies may become involved in international peace 
and security issues ‘as are appropriate for regional action’. But they and their activities must 
be consistent with the purposes and principles of the United Nations. By definition, these 
odies are regional in nature and scope. 
a plethora of regional and sub-regional trade blocs have emerged 
ver the past sixty years. 
rious problems exist with respect to clarity of the UN regional partnership. 
 to 25, some of which are demonstrably not 
ency for that 
month, and is thus open to differing national perceptions and interests. 
n as ‘Chapter VIII 
rganisations’. These bodies, with their memberships, are set out in Table 3.  
Table 3 ter VIII E alism Outside the UN
Africa Arab  States rop -Pa America 
b
 
At the time of the Charter’s conclusion, few such regional arrangements or agencies existed. 
The Pan-American Union had existed since 1910 (with its antecedents in 1890), and the 
League of Arab States was created in March 1945, just three months before the Charter was 
concluded. A number of regional bodies were created in Europe during the late 1940s and 
the 1950s – the Council of Europe (COE), the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), 
Euratom and the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957, the forerunner to the present 
European Union (EU). As the decolonisation movement proceeded, regional bodies were 
created in Africa (the Organisation of African Unity, forerunner to the present African Union 
(AU)), and the Pacific (the South Pacific Forum, forerunner to the present Pacific Islands 
Forum (PIF)). In addition, 
o
 
In the immediate post-Cold War environment of the early 1990s, with the failure of the 
international community to support the United Nations adequately to fulfill all its missions 
throughout the world, the realisation grew that a greater reliance on regional organisations 
would be necessary. Since 1994 a series of high-level meetings have been convened with 
regional organisations, chaired by the UN Secretary-General. And since 2003, four thematic 
debates have been held by the Security Council with regional organisations in attendance. 
However, se
Specifically: 
 
•  The UN Secretariat has made no effort to define a ‘regional arrangement or agency’ 
– the terminology in common usage is ‘regional organisation’ – nor has it made public 
any criteria it might use for inviting entities to attend the high-level meetings 
convened by the UN Secretary-General. The result is a large and uncoordinated 
group of organisations attending – up
regional or sub-regional organisations.  
•  Attendance at the relevant Security Council debates is consequent upon selective 
invitations issued by whichever Member State holds the Council presid
 
Of the organisations which have attended the Secretary-General’s high-level meetings, some 
14 might be regional or sub-regional bodies that could conceivably be see
o
 
: Chap ntities: Region  System  
Eu e  Asia cific 
RO SRO RO  SRO  RO  S   RO RO  SRO  RO  SRO 
A  E  L GCC COE  EU  AS N  O S  CAR OM  U COWAS AS  CIS  EA A IC
  IGAD       P   IF     
  C   EMAC          
  SA   DC          
1 4 1  1  1  1  2  1  1  1 
Other organisations attending: 
Cross-regional organisations: OSCE*, NATO, CSTO, SCO  4 
Trans-national organisations: COMSEC, OIC, IOF, CPLP    4 
Functional global agencies: Interpol, OPCW                     2 
 
                                                 
34   “Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies 
or dealing with such matters relating to the mainte f
a
nance of international peace and security as are 
ppropriate for regional action, provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are 
consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.” UN Charter, Article 52.1. 
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* The OSCE declared itself to be a ‘regional organisation’ for the purposes of Chapter VIII of the UN 
harter, and this was ‘welcomed’ by the UN General Assembly (A/RES/47/10, 28 October 1992). If, 
 Locations of UN Global and Regional Offices 
xternal UN partnership network.  
 with regionalism 
apital’. Table 4 (last column) shows 
t host the 55 major UN bodies. The 
llowing features of UN institutional locations may be noted from the table: 
al relics and today the ‘Northern skew’ of UN locations exacerbates the notion 
of political and cultural preference, undermining the global legitimacy of the UN system. 
Today, some 83% of humanity resides in the South (Asia comprises 60%, Africa 14% and Latin 
America / Caribbean 9%). One of the challenges facing the ‘system-wide’ rationalisation of 
the United Nations will be to reduce this ‘Northern skew’ for greater legitimacy of the 
organisation. 
                                                
C
however, strict criteria of membership and territorial jurisdiction are applied, it should be regarded as a 
cross-regional organisation. See Graham, Kennedy and Felício, Tânia, Regional Security and Global 
Governance, Brussels, VUB Press, 2006, pp. 133-146. 
 
3.2. Current
 
Closely related to the delineation of ‘regions’ is the decision of where to site a regional office. 
As with section 3.1, the analysis of current locations is shown in the context of both the internal 
N system and the e U
 
UN System 
 
The location of UN offices can take the forms of a global UN office headquarter or of a 
regional UN office.  
 
Table 4 illustrates the sites of the principal UN entities (global offices) in the world. Some 16 
cities host its 5 principal organs,35 4 offices, 11 programmes and funds, 5 institutes, 5 other UN 
entities, 15 specialised agencies, and 5 related organisations. That comprises 50 different UN 
bodies in 16 cities. The global bodies are sited in a particular city for certain political reasons – 
essentially the resistance to any notion that a global or even regional ‘capital’ is emerging, 
a n d  a  s t r o n g  p u s h  f r o m  o n e  c o u n t r y  t o  h o s t  a UN body, usually for purposes of political 
restige and income generation. The outcome of choice thus has little to do p
per se. The site of a regional economic commission, however, reflects a conscious decision 
pertaining to regionalism. In effect, it denotes a ‘regional c
the location of the five UN regional economic commissions. This adds an additional four host 
cities, resulting in a bewildering array of 20 cities in all tha
fo
 
•  The dominance of the North: 13 of the 20 cities are located in North America or 
Europe (Europe accounts for half of the 20 cities). 
•  Setting aside the five regional commissions, only four host cities out of 15 are located 
in the South (one in Latin America, three in Africa). 
 
There are no doubt historical reasons for this – the creation of most UN entities in the 1940s 
and 1950s before the decolonalisation movement was complete, along with the North’s 
capacity to construct and maintain adequate buildings and to host sophisticated 
conferences and events in greater style and with greater ease. Those facts, however, are 
largely historic
 
35    The sixth principal organ, the Trusteeship Council, no longer functions, having completed its 
mandate in 1994.  
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Table 4: UN System: Location of Global and Regional Offices 
 Global    Regional 
Region 
 
Principal 
UN 
organs 
UN 
offices 
Special. 
agencies 
Related 
organis. 
UN 
progr. & 
funds 
UN 
institutes 
Other 
UN 
entities 
Regional 
Econ. 
Comm. 
North 
America 
           
New York  UNGA 
UNSC 
ECOSOC 
SECRTR 
HQ     UNICEF 
UNDP 
UNIFEM 
UNFPA 
UNITAR UNOPS   
Washington     IMF 
IBRD 
      
M o n t r e a l      I C A O         
Europe             
Geneva 
 
 UNOG  ILO 
WHO 
ITU 
WMO 
WIPO 
WTO UNCTAD 
UNHCR 
UNRISD 
UNIDIR 
UNHRC 
UNAIDS 
ECE 
Bern     UPU        
Vienna   UNOV  UNIDO  IAEA  UNODC       
The Hague  ICJ      ICC 
OPCW 
CTBTO 
     
Paris     UNESCO        
L o n d o n      I M O         
M a d r i d      U N W T O         
Rome     FAO 
IFAD 
 WFP      
Turin         UNICRI  UNSC   
Bonn        UNV      
Africa             
Nairobi   UNON      UNEP 
HABITAT 
    
Addis 
Ababa 
          E C A  
Arabia              
B e i r u t             E S C W A  
Asia             
Bangkok            ESCAP 
Tokyo          UNU   
Latin 
America 
           
Santo 
Domingo 
       I N S T R A W      
S a n t i a g o             E C L A  
 
Table 5 below shows the ‘site spread’ of both headquarters and regional offices of the 25 
principal entities of the UN system plus the Secretariat. The following may be inferred: 
 
•  Irrespective of which city sites its headquarters, a UN entity almost always has a 
regional office in a city of each region (in addition to many country offices). There is 
thus a modest difference only in terms of the ‘global spread’ of all UN entities, 
irrespective of where the headquarter is located. The result is less ‘regional skew’ than 
is implied solely by the location of the headquarter.  
•  New York is the natural headquarter of the UN itself, accounting for the Secretariat 
and half of its programmes and funds. The other half, however, are located elsewhere 
(two offices in Europe and two in Africa). This inevitably works against ‘UN consistency 
and coherence’. 
•  The specialised agencies and related organisations are all located outside New York – 
the large majority in Europe (9 out of 12) and the remainder in North America. Not one 
headquarter of a specialised agency or related organisation is sited in the South. The 
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reasons for this need to be explored in more depth than that accorded by the HLP 
(see below).  
•  In some cases a Member State sites UN entities in more cities than simply its capital. 
This would seem to take the principle of ‘geographical spread’ to near-dysfunctional 
lengths. 
•  The ‘intra-regional spread’ of cities is marked: with 16 in the Americas, 14 in Africa, 14 
in Asia and 10 in Europe (4 in the Arab area). This reinforces the supposition that 
political rivalry results in a current disbursal of ‘UN cities’ across a region, at the cost of 
UN consistency and coherence.  
•  Notwithstanding such an ‘intra-regional spread’, some natural patterns of UN-siting 
may be discerned. The natural ‘regional capitals’ would seem to be the following 
(excluding New York as the ‘global capital’): 
Africa:   Nairobi, Dakar, Addis Ababa 
Arab world:  Cairo, Amman 
Europe: Geneva,  Bratislava 
Asia-Pacific: Bangkok 
Americas:  Washington, Mexico City, Santiago 
 
The above conclusions are entirely ‘clinical’ observations based on statistics. They have the 
weakness but also the strength of disregarding the political complexities that force diplomatic 
decisions on where a UN entity is to site its headquarter and regional offices. The question 
inevitably arises: to what extent are political considerations (national prestige and rivalry, 
local income-generation) a legitimate factor to take into account within the context of 
promoting UN consistency and coherence? How many Member States that trenchantly 
critique the coordination and efficiency weaknesses of the UN system would rile at the 
suggested response that they should surrender their capital city as a UN host-site in favour of 
a neighbouring country?  
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Table 5: UN System: Headquarters and Regional Office Locations* 
  Africa Arab  States Europe  Asia-Pacific Americas 
UN Secretariat  Nairobi   Geneva 
Vienna 
  New York 
UN Reg. Econ. 
Commissions 
Addis Amman 
 
Geneva Bangkok  Santiago 
UN Programmes         
- UNICEF  Nairobi 
Dakar 
Amman 
 
Geneva Bangkok 
Kathmandu 
New York 
 
- UNDP      Bratislava  Bangkok 
Colombo 
Suva 
New York 
 
- UNIFEM  Nairobi 
Kigali 
Abuja 
Dakar 
Johannesburg 
 Bratislava 
 
Bangkok 
Almaty 
New Delhi 
Suva 
New York 
Quito 
Chch (Barbados) 
Mexico City 
Brasilia 
- UNFPA  Addis 
Dakar 
Harare 
Amman 
 
Bratislava Bangkok 
Kathmandu 
Suva 
New York 
Mexico City 
 
- UNHCR  Dakar 
Kinshasha 
Lusaka 
Pretoria 
Cairo  Geneva 
Stockholm 
Brussels 
Vienna 
Moscow 
Beijing 
Tokyo 
Jakarta 
Canberra 
Washington 
Mexico City 
Caracas 
Buenos Aires 
- WFP  Dakar 
Kampala 
Johannesburg 
Cairo 
 
Rome  Bangkok Panama  City 
- UNEP  Nairobi  
Nairobi 
Manama 
 
Geneva Bangkok  Washington 
Mexico City 
- HABITAT  Nairobi 
Nairobi 
    Fukuoka  Rio de Janeiro 
Specialised 
Agencies 
       
- IMF          Washington 
- IBRD  Johannesburg      Almaty 
Hong Kong 
Washington 
- ICAO  Dakar 
Nairobi 
Cairo 
 
Paris Bangkok  Montreal 
Lima 
Mexico City 
- UPU  Harare  Cairo 
 
Berne 
Bratislava 
Bangkok San  Jose 
- ITU  Addis  Cairo 
 
Geneva 
Moscow 
Bangkok Brasilia 
- ILO  Addis  Beirut 
 
Geneva 
Geneva 
Bangkok Lima 
- WHO  Brazzaville  Cairo 
 
Geneva 
Copenhagen 
New Delhi 
Manila 
Washington 
- WMO  Lagos 
Nairobi 
Manama 
 
Geneva  Apia 
 
San Jose 
Asuncion  
- WIPO     Geneva    
- FAO  Accra  Cairo  Rome  Bangkok Santiago 
Related 
Organisations 
       
- WTO     Geneva    
- IAEA      Vienna 
Geneva 
 New  York, 
Toronto 
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Total 
Sites 
Addis Ababa 
Dakar 
Accra 
Abuja 
Lagos 
Nairobi 
Brazzaville 
Kinshasha 
Kampala 
Kigali 
Lusaka 
Harare  
Pretoria 
Johannesburg 
4 
6 
1 
1 
1 
9 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
1 
2 
Cairo 
Beirut 
Amman 
Manama 
7 
1 
3 
2 
 
Stockholm 
Copenhagen 
Brussels 
Paris 
Berne 
Geneva 
Rome 
Vienna 
Bratislava 
Moscow 
 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
13 
2 
3 
4 
2 
Almaty 
Kathmandu 
New Delhi 
Colombo 
Bangkok 
Jakarta 
Manila 
Tokyo 
Fukuoka 
Beijing 
Hong Kong 
Suva 
Apia 
Canberra 
2 
2 
2 
1 
12 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
1 
1 
Montreal 
Toronto 
New York 
Washington 
Mexico City 
San José 
Panama C. 
Brigetown 
Quito 
Lima 
Santiago 
Caracas 
Brasilia 
Rio Janeiro 
Asuncion 
Buenos Aires 
1 
1 
6 
5 
5 
2 
1 
2 
1 
2 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
   * Cities in bold italics are the headquarters of each organisation, commission or programme. 
 
Office Locations outside the UN System 
 
The host cities of the regional organisations that meet under ‘Chapter VIII’ auspices reveal 
some interesting facts. The comparison between the host cities for Chapter VIII regional 
organisations and ‘Chapter X’ UN regional commissions is illustrated in Table 6. Except for 
Africa, there is no consistency. 
 
Table 6: Regional Host Cities: ‘Chapter VIII’ and ‘Chapter X’ Institutions 
Regional Organisation (Chapter VIII)  UN Regional Commission (Chapter X) 
Institution  Host city  Institution  Host city 
African Union (AU)    Addis Ababa  ECA  Addis Ababa 
Arab League (LAS)    Cairo  ECWA  Amman 
Council of Europe (COE)    Strasbourg 
European Union (EU)    Brussels 
Commonwealth of Independent States 
(CIS) 
  Minsk 
 
ECE 
 
Geneva 
South Asian Association for Regional 
Cooperation (SAARC) 
  Kathmandu 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) 
  Jakarta 
Pacific Islands Forum (PIF)    Suva 
 
 
ESCAP 
 
 
Bangkok 
Organisation of American States (OAS)    Washington  ECLA  Santiago 
 
As can be seen from the table above, there is almost no consistency in choice between the 
‘UN system cities’ and the regional ‘exogenous body cities’.  
 
 
4. Prescription: A ‘Coherent Regional Institutional Landscape’ 
 
The High-level Panel has called for measures that will result in a ‘coherent regional institutional 
landscape’ for the UN system. For this to occur there will be, it is submitted, a requirement for 
a reconfiguration of the ‘regional setting’ of the UN’s activities, agreement on a standardised 
definition of a ‘region’ and identification of specific regions, and agreement on one city 
within each region to act as a regional hub where UN regional offices can be located. These 
prescriptive measures are explored in this section.  
 
4.1. Reconfiguration of the UN Regional Setting 
 
From the views expressed by world leaders at the 2005 Summit and by others in the course of 
the Panel’s consultations, it is clear that fundamental change is required and expected of the 
UN system. With respect to the regional dimension of the issue, three questions are to be 
addressed: 
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•  whether the concept of ‘region’ can be clarified and agreement reached sufficiently 
for a coherent group of regions to act as a common structure for all of the UN’s 
activities; 
•  if so, whether that coherent, reconfigured ‘UN regional setting’ might apply not only 
to socio-economic (developmental, humanitarian and environmental) aspects of the 
UN’s operations but also to security aspects (conflict prevention/resolution and peace 
enforcement) and human rights – the other two ‘pillars’ of the United Nations; and  
•  if so, whether that regional coherence can embrace both the UN system and the 
exogenous regional institutional architecture identified in section 3.1.  
 
In addressing these questions, much depends on what stakeholder interests are served in 
each purpose. As noted earlier, there are two functions performed through regionalism within 
the international community – electoral and operational. The latter may be further identified 
as of two purposes – socio-economic and security operations. Each of these provides the 
contextual setting for the fundamental values required in determining the most appropriate 
form of regionalism. In UN terms, the two most fundamental values that the international 
community is striving to promote in its regional and global institutional architecture are 
legitimacy and effectiveness. It is possible, it seems, to prescribe the most appropriate form of 
regionalism, for each purpose, according to the relative weight to be applied for each value. 
This prescriptive schema, employing both purposes and values as the criteria for determining 
the best regional architectural structure, and assessing their relative weight, is depicted in 
Table 7.  
 
Table 7: UN Regionalism: Purposes and Values 
Purpose Values 
   Legitimacy  Effectiveness 
Electoral   High Medium 
Operational Socio-economic  Medium High 
 Security  High High 
 
Application of these criteria generates a further level of analysis. Legitimacy is most critical for 
representational purposes, while effectiveness is dependent primarily on efficiency – through 
consistency and coherence. Thus, while ‘optimal representation’ is critical for the purposes of 
electoral groupings in the UN system, ‘optimal efficiency’ is most critical for the purposes of 
operational effectiveness – in both socio-economic and security functions. This is not to imply 
that the other value is unimportant in each case36 – but rather to identify the relative priority 
for each, as the sine qua non for the international community’s acceptance of the UN and 
related institutions (and thus the readiness of Member States to extend support – financial, 
political and human).  
 
The judgements to be made in this respect require a degree of subtlety. The electoral 
groupings, for example, were, as noted, originally devised for the purposes of distributing 
seats on UN bodies. Over the years they have acquired two associated functions. First, the 
electoral dimension has come to imply a ‘representational element’ – but it is left unclear to 
what extent a Member State duly elected to a UN body is expected to ‘represent’ all other 
members of that group. And is that ‘representation-ness’ more easily achieved in less sensitive 
areas than others – such as most socio-economic functions compared with security? Much 
depends on the body to which a Member State is being elected. 
 
If, for example, Australia, Canada and New Zealand were to re-locate into their 
geographical rather than their current political groups, what might this mean for their 
representation abilities and that of their new colleagues? Might Australia be credibly 
expected to ‘represent’ Indonesia in the Security Council? Might Venezuela duly act on 
behalf of Canada in global aid, trade and investment bodies such as UNDP or the World 
Bank? Having regard to these considerations, what might be the definition of a ‘region’ that 
                                                 
36    Both legitimacy and effectiveness, in fact, can be improved by increased consistency and 
coherence. 
  21 BRIGG Paper 1/2008 
could satisfy all purposes and meet all values postulated for consistency and coherence 
within the UN system and its broader partnership network?  
 
4.2. A Standardised Definition of ‘Region’ 
 
The lack of a standardised definition of ‘region’, continues to seriously hamper both the 
development of an effective collaborative ‘global-regional’ partnership between the United 
Nations and regional entities and the achievement of ‘consistency and coherence’ within 
the UN system itself. It is instructive, therefore, to consider the history of the efforts to date by 
the international community to develop the concept of ‘region’ in a political and legal sense, 
before considering what might be done to reach a standardised definition. 
 
Approaching the Concept of ‘Region’: A Brief Review 
 
In 1919 the architects of the League of Nations had perhaps a clearer, if more rudimentary, 
concept of a ‘region’ than their mid-century successors. For them, a region was, at least for 
the purposes of international security, Europe or America. Most of Asia, Africa and the Pacific 
remained colonised. The security structures in place in the 19th century for Europe and the 
Americas naturally lent themselves to security planning at the global level. Nonetheless, there 
was no definition of a ‘region’ offered at Versailles. Indeed, the Euro-centric focus of post-war 
planning a century ago is shown by the sole reference to ‘region’ in the Covenant – that the 
special necessities of the ‘regions devastated during the war of 1914-18’ shall be borne in 
mind in re-building post-war commerce.37 In the mid-20th century, the architects of the UN 
had to confront a more comprehensive notion of ‘region’ and adopt a more focused 
concept of regional security. During the planning period for the United Nations (1942-45), the 
debate was vigorously pursued between underpinning international security with a 
centralised authority structure (the UN Security Council) or with a network of regional security 
councils (one each for Europe, America and Asia).  
 
That debate was evenly balanced and at the San Francisco Conference a majority of 
delegations in fact favoured a decentralised regional structure. The strong preference of the 
United States for a centralised global body prevailed but the concerns of the Latin American 
and Arab countries resulted in a compromise arrangement. The largely nascent regional 
organisations of 1945 were acknowledged as having a role in security but ‘mildly dis-
couraged’ from being too assertive in that role. Chapter VIII of the UN Charter accords 
regional organisations the freedom of initiative in pacific settlement but keeps them clearly 
subordinate to, and constrained by, the Security Council on enforcement action.38 During this 
formative time, however, the concept of a ‘region’ that could be universally applicable 
around the world was never agreed upon. At San Francisco, a definition was advanced by 
Egypt and considered by delegates:  
 
“There shall be considered, as regional arrangements, organisations of a permanent nature 
grouping in a given geographical area several countries which, by reason of their proximity, 
community of interests or cultural, linguistic, historical or spiritual affinities make themselves 
jointly responsible for the peaceful settlement of any disputes which may arise … as well as for 
the safeguarding of their interests and the development of their economic and cultural 
relations.”39 
 
Thus three key criteria are advanced for the definition of a ‘region’ under the UN Charter, 
namely: geographical proximity; community of interest; and common affinities. Neither this 
nor any other definition of a ‘region’ has been officially agreed at the UN. While this leaves 
                                                 
37   League of Nations Covenant (1919), Article 23.  
38   UN Charter, Articles 52 and 53. See Graham, Kennedy and Felício, Tânia, Regional Security and 
Global Governance, Brussels, VUB Press, 2006, chapter 2, for a detailed analysis of the negotiating 
history for the League of Nations and the United Nations. 
39    UNCIO XII, pp. 850, 857, 8 June 1945, in Simma, Bruno, The United Nations Charter: A 
Commentary, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995, pp. 688-689. Also Russett, Bruce, International 
Regions and International System:  Study in Political Ecology, Chicago, Rand McNally & Co., 1967, p. 4.  
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scope for diplomatic flexibility, it does nothing to enhance clarity in law or policy. Although 
never adopted, the 1945 draft definition serves today as good a definition of a ‘region’ as 
any. It is therefore proposed in this Paper that the definition of a ‘region’ and its three 
supporting criteria, considered at the San Francisco Conference in 1945, be reintroduced 
onto the agenda of the General Assembly as part of the forthcoming deliberations of the 
Panel’s report on UN system-wide coherence. Having regard to the considerations identified 
above, and employing the 1945 definition of a ‘region, it is, in the author’s assessment, 
possible to determine the importance of each criterion for each UN purpose. This is shown in 
Table 8.  
 
Table 8: 1945 Definition: Relative Weighting of Criteria 
  UN System  Regional Organisation 
Function Electoral    Operational 
   Socio-economic  Security 
Principal Value  Legitimacy  Efficiency  Legitimacy & Efficiency 
Geographical proximity  desirable  necessary  necessary 
Community of interest  necessary  desirable  necessary 
Common affinities   necessary  desirable  necessary 
 
This table illustrates the following: 
 
•  for legitimacy to be guaranteed in electoral groupings, there must be a high level of 
community of interest and common affinities among all Member States within a 
group; 
•  for efficiency to be genuinely achieved in socio-economic operations within the UN 
system, a high degree of geographical proximity is required, over and above 
common interests and affinities;40 and 
•  for the UN and exogenous Chapter VIII regional organisations to be both legitimate 
and efficient, a high degree must exist in all three criteria – proximity, interest and 
affinity.  
 
Contemporary Approaches to ‘Region’: Prospects of Consensus 
 
Achieving clarity over the concept of ‘region’ for the purposes of a regional-global security 
system should not be beyond the reach of the international community.  Considerable effort 
has recently been invested in clarifying the concept of ‘region’ and applying it in a practical 
way to the current institutional architecture of global and regional bodies. Three reports, in 
particular, are notable in this respect: the Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel; the UNU’s 
1999 seminar on ‘Equitable Geographical Representation’; and the UNU-CRIS/VUB research 
project on a ‘Global-Regional Security Mechanism’. A recent high-level panel reporting to 
the Secretary-General identified, for the purpose of possible future Security Council 
composition, the obvious four ‘regions’: Africa, America, Asia and Europe.41  
 
That broad-brush approach, however, suffers from two shortcomings: first, it disregards the 
complicating factor of two other ‘regions’ whose notions of separate linguistic, cultural or 
spiritual affinities have taken institutionalised form, namely the Arab world (that is, North Africa 
– West Asia, which could be termed ‘Arabia’) and the Pacific.42 Second, it overlooks the fact 
                                                 
40   Experience has shown that common interest and affinities alone do not necessarily make for 
efficiency. Some countries that possess these characteristics are not among the most efficient in 
economic terms, and the same might be asserted for regions. Obversely, proximity acts as a positive 
factor in promoting efficiency – a negative correlation obtains between distance and efficiency.  
41   A More Secure World – Our Shared Responsibility, Report of the UN Secretary-General’s High-
level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, New York, United Nations, A/59/565; 29 November 
2004. The Panel offered two alternative options for an enlarged Security Council of 24 States, both 
models reflecting that regional division.  
42   The shortcoming of this approach is the overlap of ‘Arabia’ with Africa (i.e. North Africa) and 
Asia (West Asia). Here geographical precision cedes to the political imperative of the cultural-spiritual 
affinities of a ‘region’. 
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that ‘Asia’ is so vast and, apart from the south-east, has no institutionalised embodiment of 
security organisation.  
 
In March 1999 the UNU convened a seminar in New York, entitled ‘What is Equitable Geo-
graphic Representation in the Twenty-first Century?’. In the course of that discussion a new 
regional configuration to suit contemporary realities was advanced which identifies nine 
regions for the purposes of UN electoral groups.43 This is set out in Table 9.  
 
Table 9: Proposed Electoral Groupings: A Nine-Region Approach 
Eurasia (21) 
Afghanistan 
Asia-Pacific (25) 
Australia 
Mediterranean-Gulf (19) 
Algeria 
North Europe (19)  
Belgium 
South Europe (20)  
Albania 
North Africa (23)  
Benin 
Southern Africa (23)  
Angola 
Americas (19)  
Argentina 
Caribbean (16)  
Antigua/Barbuda 
 
In 2006 the UNU’s Comparative Regional Integration Studies programme produced a book 
reflecting the research work undertaken in its ‘regional security and global governance’ 
project. Taking as its cue the Secretary-General’s call for the construction of a ‘regional-
global security partnership’, the project explored a set of ‘security regions’ that could partner 
with the UN under Chapter VIII of the Charter.  A series of nine ‘security regions’ was 
envisaged, comprised of sub-Saharan Africa, Europe, Arabia, Central Asia, South Asia, East 
Asia, Southeast Asia, the Pacific and the Americas. In six of the nine regions, a ‘regional 
organisation’ already exists for collaborating with the United Nations in the maintenance of 
international peace and security, namely, the African Union (AU), League of Arab States 
(LAS), Council of Europe (COE), Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Pacific 
Islands Forum (PIF), and the Organisation of American States (OAS).  
 
Clearly, the global overview of regionalism is not perfect or even complete. In Asia, three 
regions either lack an associated organisation (East Asia) or the organisation is weak (CIS in 
Central Asia) or not mandated for a security function (SAARC in South Asia). The case of 
Europe is complex: the COE is pan-European but undertakes a ‘soft security’ function only 
(pacific settlement). By contrast, the EU is sub-regional (with 27 out of 45 European States), 
and it engages in ‘hard security’ (through enforcement action) outside Europe. Strictly, this 
disqualifies the EU as a ‘regional agency’ under the Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. Having 
regard, however, to the various studies undertaken, it would appear that a structure of nine 
regions, as set out in Table 10, is the most appropriate and feasible arrangement. 
 
Table 10: Proposed Security Regions: A Nine-Region Approach  
Sub-Saharan Africa  Arab Region  Europe 
Central Asia  South Asia  East Asia 
Southeast Asia  Pacific  Americas 
 
Whatever number of ‘regions’ is decided, the interests of the major stakeholders must be met 
in seeking a common regional structure: UN electoral groupings, UN socio-economic opera-
tions and UN security operations. It needs to be considered whether the various considera-
tions behind each of the these three stakeholder interests warrant a different regional 
structure or whether a common regional structure can be applied to all. This requires 
determining what criteria are important to each of the three. 
 
                                                 
43    O’Brien, Terrence, ‘Electoral Group Reconfiguration and Present Day Realities’, in Ramesh 
Thakur (ed.), What is Equitable Geographic Representation in the Twenty-first Century?, Tokyo, UNU 
Press, 1999, pp. 30-39.  
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4.3. Identification of Regional Hubs and Co-Location of Regional Offices 
 
Identifying regional hubs and co-locating regional offices will carry major implications for 
both the structural and operational dimensions of the international institutional architecture. 
Achieving consistency and coherence requires that any changes made reflect a set of 
principles or criteria that are transparent and applicable across-the-board. The identification 
of regional hubs and location of regional offices is dependent on the prior identification of 
regions themselves; agreeing on regional capitals cannot be achieved without agreement 
on the region they will be serving. This is not an easy task. The only way to reach agreement 
on the world’s ‘regions’ for the purpose of the United Nations would seem to be to develop a 
set of principles for the purpose. Criteria for deciding a ‘region’ should, in the author’s view, 
be those advanced in the 1945 definition: geographical proximity; community of interest; and 
common affinity.  
 
Applying these criteria produces the following challenges: 
 
•  Africa is a geographically intact region with natural boundaries whose only 
requirement is agreement that its north-east extremity is Egypt with the Suez Canal 
and the Red Sea. But do the common affinities and community of interests require 
that North Africa, with the Arab states, form a separate region? If it did, there is no 
natural geographical boundary between these two ‘regions’, and the separation 
factor becomes the political fiction of the nation-state. 
•  Asia, comprising 60% of humankind, is such a vast and heterogeneous area that it 
would seem to qualify as several regions – West Asia, Central Asia, South Asia, 
Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia. Is this distinction based on geographical or 
political differences? Would West Asia join with fellow Arab States as an ‘Arab region’ 
comprising ‘North Africa / West Asia’ as the World Bank group does? What are the 
qualifying ‘common affinities’ – historical, cultural and religious?44 With what degree 
of transparency and formality might they be proclaimed? 
                                                
•  How is Europe and Asia to be separately delineated? Where are Turkey, Georgia, 
Armenia, Azerbaijan and Russia – in Europe or (Central) Asia? 
•  Should the Pacific be regarded as a separate ‘region’, given its relatively small size, or 
should it be simply a sub-region of Southeast Asia? 
 
Agreement would need to be reached on these issues. To some extent they are already 
answered in a de facto way, through autonomous decisions made over the years with 
regard to Chapter VIII regional organisations. Yet these decisions have not, hitherto, been 
formalised in any way and have borne no relationship to decisions made within the UN 
system pertaining to regional structures. Principles used to assist decision-making in this regard 
might be the following: 
 
•  agreement on the identification of ‘regions’ within the UN system for Chapter IX and X 
entities; 
•  recommendation to the broader UN cooperative network that the same structure of 
regions be adopted by Chapter VIII entities;  
•  identification of one capital city in each region, to act as regional hub and location 
of the UN Regional Office; 
•  agreement, where appropriate, of sub-regions within a region; and 
•  identification of one capital city for each sub-region, to act as sub-regional hub and 
location of the UN Sub-regional Office.  
 
44    The Vienna Declaration on Human Rights could perhaps be constructively applied to this 
purpose. “All human rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent and interrelated. The internatio-
nal community must treat human rights globally in a fair and equal manner, on the same footing, and 
with the same emphasis. While the significance of national and regional particularities and various 
historical, cultural and religious backgrounds must be borne in mind, it is the duty of States, regardless of 
their political, economic and cultural systems, to promote and protect all human rights and fundamen-
tal freedoms.” World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna Declaration & Programme of Action, June 
1993, para. 5. 
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Application of the above criteria would suggest the following regions and UN regional and 
sub-regional offices, as depicted in Table 11.  
 
Table 11: A Possible Schema of Regions and Regional Offices  
Region  Sub-region  Regional Office  Sub-regional Office 
Sub-Saharan Africa    Addis Ababa   
 West  Africa   Abuja 
 East  Africa   Nairobi 
 Central  Africa   Kinshasha 
 Southern  Africa   Pretoria 
‘Arabia’   Cairo  
 Maghreb   Tunis 
 Mashreq   Amman 
 Gulf   Doha 
Europe   Geneva  
 Northern  Europe   Stockholm 
 Western  Europe   Brussels 
 Central  Europe   Vienna 
 Eastern  Europe   Bratislava 
Central Asia    Astana  
South Asia    New Delhi   
Northeast Asia    Ulaan Baatar   
Southeast Asia    Bangkok  
Pacific   Suva  
 Micronesia   Palikir 
 Melanesia   Port  Vila 
 Polynesia   Apia 
America   San José   
 North  America   Washington 
 Caribbean   Kingston 
 Central  America   Managua 
 Andes   Quito 
 Southern  Cone   Buenos  Aires 
 
The above schema is fraught with political hazard – not dissimilar to the regional rivalry that 
attends the issue of UN Security Council permanent membership. Where does it leave Algiers, 
Paris, Islamabad, Jakarta, Tokyo, Canberra and Brasilia?  
 
The Sensitivity of ‘Capital Cities’ 
 
One of the problems of achieving consistency and coherence in the internal / external UN 
institutional network concerns the sensitivity of using the term ‘capital’ in reference to cities 
hosting UN offices. New York is often described, not least by its inhabitants, as the ‘world’s 
capital’. While this may be partially acceptable because of the unique status of that 
particular city (it is not the capital of the host country); the host country is the world’s 
superpower; there is a certain bravado to the city style that gives it a passing licence over 
self-image, this is not the case elsewhere. The notion of regional ‘capitals’ carries a sensitivity 
that is highly political and can act as an obstacle to reaching agreement on the question of 
hosting. As Table 7 illustrated, of the nine cases of potential comparison between ‘Chapter 
VIII’ regional organisations and ‘Chapter X’ UN regional commissions, there is consistency in 
choice of host cities in only one case.  
 
W h e t h e r  t h i s  r e f l e c t s  a  c o n s c i o u s  s y n d r o m e  o n  t h e  p a r t  o f  e a c h  ‘ r e g i o n ’  t o  s p r e a d  t h e  
prestige and burden or whether it is simply an historical anomaly is perhaps the subject of a 
separate study. It does, however, give rise to difficulties and challenges in promoting 
consistency in the regional institutional architecture of global politics in the 21st century. Some 
way would need to be found of accommodating this. One way would be to simply recognise 
the distinction between the UN system (Chapter X) and the broader UN network (Chapter 
VIII) and leave the matter untouched.  
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Chapter VIII and Chapter X Purposes 
 
It needs to be considered whether the aims of the Chapter VIII and Chapter X entities are 
sufficiently common to warrant consideration of ‘broad consistency and coherence’ 
between them. The purposes of the African Union,45 for example, and that of the Economic 
Commission for Africa46 are closely comparable – even though those of the AU are 
considerably broader than those of the ECA. It would seem that part of the future work in 
strengthening consistency and coherence within the UN system could usefully extend to 
ensuring operational compatibility between the broader aims of Chapter VIII organisations 
and the more sectorally-focused economic and social aims of the UN regional commissions.  
 
 
5. The Specific Case of Europe 
 
Somewhat paradoxically, Europe presents an especially complex case for attaining UN 
system-wide coherence. As noted before, the continents of Africa, Australia and America are 
geographically separate and clearly delineated. Regional delineation, however, becomes 
more opaque when the question is addressed of the border between the two other major 
continents – Europe and Asia. In addition, the age-old rivalries and sensitivities between 
leading European cities, accustomed as they have been to self-perceptions of traditional 
global leadership, heightens the difficulty of achieving consensus over any co-location of UN 
offices or the identification of any ‘regional capital’. Finally, the relative wealth and power of 
Europe and its historical role as a leading donor rather than recipient within the global 
political framework results in a lesser focus on European issues in the UN system. For these 
reasons, application of the recommendations of the Panel’s report in the case of Europe may 
prove to be more problematic than elsewhere. 
 
                                                 
45 The objectives of the Union shall be (AU Constitutive Act 2000, Article 3): 
(a)  achieve greater unity and solidarity between the African countries and the peoples of Africa; 
(b)  defend the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of its Member States; 
(c)  accelerate the political and socio-economic integration of the continent; 
(d)  promote and defend African common positions on issues of interest to the continent and its 
peoples; 
(e)  encourage international cooperation, taking due account of the Charter of the United Nations 
and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; 
(f)  promote peace, security and stability on the continent; 
(g)  promote democratic principles and institutions, popular participation and good governance; 
(h)  promote and protect human and peoples’ rights in accordance with the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights and other relevant human rights instruments; 
(i)  establish the necessary conditions which enable the continent to play its rightful role in the 
global economy and in international organisations; 
(j)  promote sustainable development at the economic, social and cultural levels as well as the 
integration of African economies; 
(k)  promote cooperation in all fields of human activity to raise the living standards of African 
peoples; 
(l)  coordinate and harmonize the policies between the existing and future Regional Economic 
Communities for the gradual attainment of the objectives of the Union; 
(m)  advance the development of the continent by promoting research in all fields, in particular in 
science and technology; 
(n)  work with relevant international partners in the eradication of preventable diseases and the 
promotion of good health on the continent. 
46   ECA’s first Term of Reference is the participation “in measures for facilitating concerted action 
for the economic development of Africa, including its social aspects, with a view to raising the level of 
economic activity and standards of living in Africa and for maintaining and strengthening the 
economic relations of countries and territories in Africa”.  ECOSOC Resolution 671 (XXV), 29 April 1958.   
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Europe as a ‘Region’ 
 
Europe as a ‘region’ is not easy to define. De Gaulle’s depiction of Europe ‘from the Atlantic 
to the Urals’ reflects the standard concept but it fails to trace the geo-political border further 
south which is where the difficulties arise: 
 
•  The 1st century Greek geographer, Strabo, identified Europe’s south-eastern boundary 
to be the River Don (then the Tanais), flowing south from Ukraine and Russia into the 
Sea of Azov (east of the Crimean Peninsula) and thus the Black Sea. This would 
encompass Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus.  
•  Swedish geographer von Strahlenberg, in the 17th century, placed the boundary even 
further east, following the Urals south but thereafter tracing the Eurasian boundary 
along the Emba River which flows southeast through Kazakhstan into the Caspian Sea. 
Thus Europe would encompass Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Kazakhstan as well. 
•  Modern geographers are generally agreed over the final disputable boundary – the 
Bosporus – that is, the part of Turkey to the west (Rumelia) is part of Europe and that to 
the east (Anatolia) is part of Asia.   
 
Thus the most plausible geographic boundary of Europe – the north-south peaks of the Urals, 
the southward flow of the River Don, the eastern seaboard of the Azov and Black Seas, the 
Bosporus Strait, the eastern seaboard of the Marmara Sea and the Dardanelles – splits two 
strategically vital nation-states – Russia and Turkey, with Turkey being a candidate for EU 
membership. A final complication is the geographical status of several Mediterranean islands 
– whether they are in Europe, Asia or Africa: 
 
•  Sardinia, Corsica, Sicily, Malta47 and Crete would seem to be a natural geographical 
part of Europe.  
•  Cyprus, however, is situated close to the southern coast of Anatolia – the Asian part of 
Turkey – and to the coast of Lebanon in West Asia. Its inclusion in Europe derives simply 
from its dominant Greek population and thus its European cultural character. Yet, in 
the UN Cyprus is a member of the Asian electoral group.  
 
The most credible premise on which to develop any agreed geo-strategic position is to 
recognise a geographical definition of ‘Europe’ along the above lines, while leaving it to 
diplomatic statecraft to determine the, variable, political definition of ‘Europe’ at any one 
time. In effect, this is what the principal regional and cross-regional organisations have been 
doing over the past half-century. But this approach never provides a durable solution since 
the political framework is subject to continuous flux. 
 
The Regional Organisations 
 
The two principal organisations of Europe are the Council of Europe and the European Union. 
The COE, with 47 Member States, is genuinely pan-European, including Russia and Turkey as 
full and active members. The political complication is that the COE also includes the 
Caucasian States, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. The EU, with 27 Member States, is clearly 
not pan-European, excluding Iceland and Norway, Switzerland and most of the Balkan states 
that are clearly within the ‘region’ of Europe and are members of the COE.   
 
With regard to membership the COE thus clearly qualifies more genuinely as a regional 
European organisation. It has virtually all the European countries – Belarus remains the only 
country without membership and this will be rectified once its human rights issues are 
                                                 
47   Malta is 93 km from Sicily and 288 km from Libya, and would clearly qualify geographically as 
part of Europe. 
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resolved. With Russia included, the ‘European population’ comprises 800 million.48 Without 
Russia and the three Caucasian states, the population is still nearly 650 million. In contrast, the 
enlarged EU has 455 million, comprising not much more than half (27 out of 47) of the 
countries of Europe. Although it often speaks informally for associated states (potential 
applicants and others), the EU cannot be seen formally as a genuinely pan-European 
organisation. Rather it must be seen strictly as a sub-regional organisation. Some 20 UN 
Member States from Europe are not represented in the EU and do not necessarily see the EU 
as expressing their national views.49 
 
A further complication is purely political – the EU’s stated aspiration to develop into an 
effective ‘global actor’ in which it enjoys a global reach and undertakes global 
‘responsibilities’.50 The UN, constitutionally predicated as it is on the nation-state in all its 
sovereign equality, is unused to acknowledging an instrumental role by any regional 
organisation acting on its behalf. It is easier under the UN Charter for a major Member State – 
the US or Russia – to act globally on behalf of the UN than it is for the EU.51 When such ‘global 
actorness’ extends to the use of armed force, potential difficulties arise as regards the true 
‘regional character’ of such an organisation. While the EU-UN partnership in the area of 
security as well as the more traditional area of humanitarian and development aid is 
emerging as a major potential for good, the constitutional relationship between the UN and 
the EU as a ‘regional organisation’ has yet to be settled. The Lisbon Treaty is going some way 
to contributing to such a settlement, but if the EU emerges as a full ‘global actor’ on the 
world stage, this will have far-reaching repercussions for other regional, cross-regional and 
trans-national organisations52 and for the broader UN-regional partnership in general.  
 
The UN Network in Europe 
 
For a ‘coherent regional institutional landscape’ to be shaped in Europe, a number of 
daunting challenges will need to be overcome. Reflecting the conceptual framework outline 
in this Paper, these challenges pertain to electoral groupings for national representation at 
the UN, the UN’s ‘operational regions’ and the location of UN regional offices. Is it possible, 
                                                 
48   Russia has a large Asian population. In any event, this study suggests that Russia and the three 
Caucasian states be ‘passive’ members in the European ‘security region’, and act in a separate 
‘security region’ – Central Asia-Caucasus. The issue is finely balanced: Russia is active and influential 
within the COE. Yet the legacy of the past permeates the present. With its expansion from 15 to 27 
through the addition of many former Soviet republics and Warsaw Pact states, the EU comprises a 
potential majority voting bloc within the COE. There is an increasing tendency for decisions within the 
COE to be taken by consensus, a trend encouraged not least by Russia. 
49    Member States are now emphasising the scope for co-operation between the two 
organisations, the EU and the COE. See, for example, former Norwegian Foreign Minister: “The COE and 
the EU are based on the same fundamental values – respect for the principles of human rights and the 
rule of law. They both focus on democratic and economic development as means of promoting 
stability. The Member States of the enlarged EU make up the majority of the COE’s members, and 
together have the potential to exert significant influence on the way the COE works.  With the new 
Constitutional Treaty of Europe, we may also be looking at a new institutional relationship with the EU as 
such. We should take full advantage of the opportunities for closer co-operation this situation presents, 
taking into account both the increasingly overlapping membership, and the wider geographical scope 
of the COE”. Jan Petersen, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Norway, NUPI Seminar, Oslo, 6 September 2004. 
50   European Security Strategy, December 2003.  
51    Chapter VIII of the Charter (Articles 52 to 54) acknowledges the existence ‘regional 
arrangements or agencies’ as exogenous bodies, potentially cooperating with the UN, and accords 
discretion to them to take initiatives in pacific settlement. But initiatives in enforcement actions may only 
be undertaken under the authorisation of the Security Council which may choose not to utilise such a 
regional organisation. Regional initiatives undertaken in this respect without prior Council approval 
(ECOWAS, CIS, perhaps PIF) have raised some concern in recent decades.   
52    For details of the classification of sub-regional, regional, cross-regional and transnational 
organisations and their relationship to the UN, see Regional Security and Global Governance, Graham, 
Kennedy and Felício, Tânia, Regional Security and Global Governance, Brussels, VUB Press, 2006, 
chapters 3, 4, 5, 6 and 9.   
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and it is feasible, to iron out the historical vagaries that have produced the complicated 
contemporary mix among these three areas? 
 
The present UN electoral arrangement pertaining to Europe is imperfect to the point of being 
dysfunctional. Europe, two decades after the end of the Cold War that so deeply divided the 
continent, remains bifurcated electorally into two groupings.53 One of these groupings 
includes countries from the other side of the planet – Canada, Australia and New Zealand 
(CANZ) – and allows the superpower from the American region as well as an ‘outlier’ from 
Asia (Israel) to participate.54 In the immediate post-Cold War years, some thought was given 
to merging the two groups (WEOG, EEG) into one, to represent Europe. Arguments against 
doing so, which prevailed, were two-fold. The first was the ‘political-cultural’ argument – the 
CANZ sub-group felt more politically attuned to Europe than to Asia-Pacific or the Latin 
American hemisphere. The second was purely opportunistic – retaining two smaller groups in 
lieu of one larger group resulted in proportionately greater representation per country, 
compared with other regions.  
 
The cultural argument is a weak one and reveals the privileged position which the Western 
countries have always enjoyed within the United Nations. The Asia-Pacific group, for example, 
includes countries as culturally diverse as Morocco and Myanmar, or Iran and China. And, by 
way of direct refutation of such an argument (advanced by Australia and New Zealand), 
Cyprus, which is a member of both the COE and the EU, is a proud member of the Asia-
Pacific electoral group. Clearly, the ‘cultural argument’ for retaining the ‘two-Europe’ 
electoral group arrangement at the UN is insufficient. 
 
For its part, the ‘electoral opportunism’ argument is factually unassailable but politically 
indefensible. The combined total of the two European electoral groupings is 51 States (28 
WEO States, 23 East European States). This is smaller than both the African group (53 States) 
and the Asia-Pacific group (also 53). With Cyprus in a European group and the five 
exogenous States elsewhere, Europe would have 47 States, and Asia-Pacific would have 55. 
A renamed ‘American’ grouping would have 35 (instead of the current 33). The resulting 
regional spread would thus be more equitable across regions.  
 
The conclusion is that a merger of the present two European electoral groupings into one 
and the relocation of the five exogenous countries to their geographical regions would 
contribute to a coherent regional institutional landscape. The political feasibility of such a 
change is reasonable. There is no prohibitive reason for Canada and the US to remain outside 
an American electoral grouping, any more than they should remain outside the OAS. Equally, 
Australia and New Zealand participate in the PIF, frequently expressing their regional identity 
as Pacific – at least to a Pacific audience. The sole political problem remains Israel, which 
would, under current political circumstances, still be refused admission to any electoral 
grouping that included the Arab States. Either, therefore, Israel would need to continue the 
present fiction within the European grouping or stand alone outside any electoral group with 
special formula for its occasional participation in UN bodies. 
 
As can be discerned from Table 2, the UN system takes an immensely inconsistent approach 
to Europe in its own operational activities. The UN Secretariat has two divisions – one for 
Eastern Europe and one for Western Europe. This may once have reflected a certain political 
logic and perhaps an associated economic logic during the Cold War, but these 
considerations no longer obtain and are refuted by the embrace of East European countries 
with the EU – whose raison d’être is not only cooperation but indeed integration in full 
recognition of contemporary socio-economic disparity.  
                                                 
53   Strictly, three groupings, with Cyprus in the Asian Group. 
54    Israel has never been a member of the UN Security Council. Until 2000 it was the only UN 
Member State not to be a member of any regional group and was therefore ineligible. That year it was 
granted temporary membership of WEOG and in 2004 this was extended indefinitely. It is politically 
unlikely, however, that Israel could mount a successful candidature for the Council, even if it received 
WEOG support. 
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Having regard to other Secretariat divisions, if Asia (with, for example, Afghanistan) and the 
Pacific (with Tuvalu) can be seen as sufficiently politically aligned for the UN Secretariat to 
treat them within one bureaucratic division, or if the same obtains for North America (with 
USA) and the Caribbean (with Barbados), then the same unified incorporation can obtain for 
Western Europe (with Iceland) and Eastern Europe (with Ukraine). Indeed, as a general 
principle, the same political logic that speaks to the UN’s electoral groupings prescribed 
above would surely apply to the UN’s divisional structure.   
 
It would be a challenging exercise, however, to achieve a pure consistency across all other 
UN bodies. While the Economic Commission for Europe (ECE) is quintessentially European, 
other UN bodies are not. Some UN developmental programmes and funds and specialised 
agencies (UNICEF, UNFPA, IBRD) have no operational focus on Western Europe, yet others do 
(UNDP, UNEP, ILO, WHO, FAO). No doubt West European countries are well represented on 
the governing boards of these bodies as potential donors; but it is an increasingly open 
question whether UN developmental activities should apply across all Europe in the 21st 
century – however lightly the expenditure pattern might fall on the western part of the region.  
 
The most politically sensitive issue of all is perhaps the location of UN offices. As Tables 4 and 5 
reveal, there is a complex skein of UN offices spread across Europe. Geneva is, of course, the 
UN’s ‘second capital’, with the magnificent Palais des Nations serving as its technical 
headquarters (as New York serves as the UN’s political headquarters). Geneva also hosts the 
headquarters of the WTO, five specialised agencies, and six UN programmes and other 
operations. Yet Vienna rivals it in providing headquarters to four other such bodies, Rome 
hosts three, and The Hague hosts the two judicial bodies and two disarmament bodies, while 
London, Madrid, Turin, Bonn and Berne all host one. It would take political courage to the 
point of suicide to seek relocation of all 30 relevant UN entities within the one city – leaving 
aside the financial burden and administrative upheaval that would be involved. At what 
price, it has to be asked, does UN regional institutional coherence come?   
 
That being said, there may exist scope for undertaking some judicious measures of reform 
towards UN institutional coherence for Europe. It is, for example, well recognised that Geneva 
is the technical operational hub of the UN. If ‘efficiency and effectiveness’ are taken as the 
two criteria for judging the operational and administrative coherence of the UN within a 
region, then there is a forceful argument that all UN developmental entities should be 
headquartered in Geneva. This would suggest that, over time – say a period of two decades 
– the UN developmental agencies currently sited in Berne, Turin, Bonn, Vienna, London, 
Madrid and Rome could relocate to Geneva. This would leave The Hague to continue to host 
the judicial bodies and Paris to continue to host UNESCO. The disarmament bodies in Vienna 
(IAEA) and The Hague (OPCW, CTBTO) would relocate in Geneva, where the CD and UNIDIR 
already reside.  
 
Clearly these are intensely difficult issues, and they would need to be handled with care. The 
first step would perhaps be to establish a UN expert panel to explore the issues relevant to 
such relocations, not only in Europe but separate panels for each region. Such work would 
have the status only of background reports. It would be many years and many difficult 
negotiating sessions before any kind of political consensus could emerge on these issues. 
 
 
6. Conclusions: Towards a ‘Coherent Regional Institutional Landscape’ 
 
If the prescriptive measures outlined above are to be discussed and agreed upon, what 
process might be followed by the international community? To some extent that process is 
already underway. In transmitting the HLP report to the General Assembly, the Secretary-
General saw the recommendations as opening the way to a ‘decisive realignment of the UN 
system’.55 In March 2007, a Regional High-Level Consultation on UN system-wide coherence 
was convened in Jakarta. In April the Secretary-General submitted his own report on the 
                                                 
55   SG/SM/10724 & GA/10530, 9 November 2006. 
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Panel’s Report to the General Assembly.56 In his view, the UN needed more coherence and 
synergy so that it could ‘perform as one and be more than the sum of its parts’. The vision of a 
more coherent UN was predicated on overcoming fragmentation and uniting the system’s 
assets to enable it to ‘deliver as one at all levels’ but particularly at the country level in line 
with the principle of country ownership. The proposals themselves should be pursued as ‘an 
integrated and coherent whole’ since many were inter-connected. 
 
In April 2007, the General Assembly discussed, during its 61st Session, the reports of the High-
level Panel and the Secretary-General. In May, the Assembly’s President appointed two UN 
ambassadors (Barbados, Luxembourg) to co-chair the inter-governmental consultations on 
the reports of the High-level Panel and the Secretary-General. In June, the Assembly 
convened its first informal meeting to consider the High-level Panel’s Report. In the Jakarta 
conference co-hosted by Norway and Indonesia in March 2007, agreement was reached on 
four points: 
 
•  predictable funding for all national programmes; 
•  simplification of the administrative process of programme delivery; 
•  alignment of UN programmes with national programmes; and 
•  national ownership of the UN programmes at the country level.57 
 
In the April debate, a number of points were made. In the summation of the General 
Assembly President, there was broad agreement that the UN system had a critical role to play 
in development; that the UN must remain at the heart of the multilateral development 
process; that the UN system’s development activities must be strengthened; and that the UN 
can develop more and better development activities.58 
 
Below this level of generality, however, some disagreement is discernible: 
 
•  The G-77 plus China did not support the introduction of any ‘new conditionality’ 
through the reform process. UNGA resolution 59/250 remained the intergovern-
mentally-agreed policy framework for UN development work.  
•  The EU believed that the UN’s expertise in normative, analytical and operational work 
needed to be improved for the sake of UN effectiveness. The ‘unified programme, 
leader, budget and (where appropriate) office’ was a good starting-point.  
•  Three pilot countries (Rwanda, Cape Verde and Tanzania) called for, inter alia, 
strengthened international environmental governance, and better coordination 
between the UN and the Bretton Woods institutions. 
•  India criticised the delays in the overall process – five months after the report’s release, 
the UN Secretariat continued to struggle with operationalising the recommendations.  
•  Solomon Islands thought that the Panel had ‘oversold’ the regional aspects of the 
issue, and this needed to be redressed in the inter-governmental debate.  
•  Norway, announcing an additional grant of US$25 million for the system-wide 
coherence project, thought that the ‘four ones’ should be supported by ‘more 
coherent governance and management arrangements at the regional and head-
quarters levels’. Norway identified four areas where swift progress was necessary: 
gender equality; ‘One UN’ pilots; regional coherence; and business practices. 
Concerning regional coherence, all UN entities should be reconfigured so that there 
were more ‘regional hubs’ that could serve the country programmes.  
 
To facilitate progress in strengthening UN system-wide coherence, I suggest that the recent 
deliberations should be followed by another resolution submitted to the UN General Assembly 
proposing the establishment of a task force to develop the ‘regional recommendations’ of 
the Panel’s report. The mandate of such a task force could be to develop a standardised 
definition of a ‘region’ for the purposes of UN operations; to identify specific regions derived 
from the definition; and co-located regional offices. 
                                                 
56   A/61/836, 3 April 2007.  
57   CEB Briefing Note, p. 6. 
58   Ibid., p. 1. 
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This task would be a politically-sensitive and diplomatically-arduous one. It would, if it were to 
be implemented, take considerable time – perhaps five to ten years. But it is not impossible, 
and it is directly in line with the original conceptualisation of the need for greater consistency 
and coherence in the UN system and with the greater thrust of the High-level Panel. 
Independent of such further initiatives at the UN, it would be advisable for the two main 
European regional bodies, the COE and the EU, to undertake a joint study of the relationship 
between the UN and Europe as a ‘region’ for the purpose of clarifying the UN-European 
relationship.  
 
Such a study would address the constitutional relationship between the UN and these two 
regional bodies under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter (and its other provisions) as well as the 
relationship between the two bodies themselves. And it could be undertaken within the 
context of the High-level Panel’s recommendations for system-wide coherence within the UN 
in order to ensure greater efficiency and effectiveness in the operation of the UN within 
Europe and, in turn, greater clarity for Europe’s role within the UN system.  
 
 